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Leasing has become, throughout recent years, an increasingly important financing 
source for companies’ operational activities and has deserved some attention in the 
corporate finance literature. Understanding the leasing decision, through a comparison 
with other external financing options and an evaluation of its overall fit with firms’ 
specific characteristics has been the focus of existing investigations and it is the goal of 
this study. Our analysis is focused on the relationship between lease and debt financing 
and on an examination of firms’ leasing propensity, taking into account their particular 
features. With the adoption of three different, but complementary methodologies, we 
find that leasing propensity is greater for smaller firms, with more investment 
opportunities, in a worst financial condition, with relatively fewer specific assets and 
with lower availability of collateral. In addition, results suggest that lease and debt 
financing are seen as substitutes, as higher relative amounts of debt are associated with 
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I - INTRODUCTION 
 
The study of lease financing has deserved some attention and discussion in the 
corporate finance literature over the last several years. The major focus of these studies 
has been on firms’ decision to acquire assets’ through a lease contract or through an 
acquisition, as in “Lease or buy” (Levy and Sarnat, 1979) or “Leasing vs. Buy-and-
Borrow” (Brealey and Young, 1980).  
The first and extensively studied reason for companies to use lease financing is 
tax related. Actually, tax incentives have received the most attention by the early 
finance literature, when studying firms’ decision to lease or buy/borrow (Brealey and 
Young, 1980; Franks and Hodges, 1978; Levy and Sarnat, 1979; Myers et al., 1976). 
Despite recognizing that tax considerations are, indeed, a very important factor to be 
taken into consideration in the leasing decision, other studies, more recently, have added 
other non-tax arguments and motives  that could also play a relevant part in this matter 
(Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Mehran et al., 1999) 
When approaching the ‘lease vs buy/borrow’ dilemma, one should pay attention 
to, not only a firm’s characteristics and how these same characteristics might indicate a 
good fit between the company and the use of lease financing, but also to benchmark this 
analysis with other types of external funding, such as debt. In other words, one should 
analyze two related aspects of the ‘lease vs. buy’ decision: i) the firm’s financing 
alternatives available in the market (leases, ordinary debt, secured debt…), taking into 
consideration the pros’ and cons’ of each one and; ii) which alternative is the most 
beneficial to the firm, given its particular features.  In fact, the majority of the research 
literature in this area comprises both of these aspects due to their inherent 
interdependence, even if it focuses more in one than the other. For instance, Lewis and 
Schallheim (1992); Marston and Harris (1988) and Yan (2006) focus on the interaction 
between leases and debt whereas Finucane (1988), Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and 
Smith and Wakeman (1985) pay specific attention to firms’ leasing propensity in 
relation to firm-specific characteristics. 
In this study, these two variants are analyzed with the goal of addressing a 
simple and specific question: “Why do firms use lease financing?”. This research 
intends to understand the relationship between leases and other types of debt, the 
similarities and the differences between them, as well as measuring firms’ leasing 
propensity over several firm-specific characteristics. Particularly, it is proposed that the 
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size of a firm, its investment opportunity set, its financial state (profitability, cash-flows, 
bankruptcy potential, ability to meet fixed claims’ obligations), the specificity of its 
assets and the amount of fixed assets that can be used as collateral have an effect on that 
firm’s propensity to use lease financing. It is also questioned if leases and debt have a 
complementary or substitutability relationship, that is, if firms see lease financing as an 
alternative or as a complement to debt financing.  
The results suggest that leasing propensity is negatively related with firms’ size, 
profitability and financial health, availability of collateral and asset specificity, whereas 
a positive association is found with firms’ investment opportunity set. Regarding the 
comparison between leases and debt, a substitutability relationship is achieved, as 
higher levels of firms’ overall debt are associated with lower levels of leasing activity. 
This study’s following pages are organized as follows: Section I.1 defines 
leases; Section II summarizes previous findings on the topics in question; Section III 
presents the questions and hypotheses of this investigation; Section IV describes the 
data gathered and the methodology adopted; Section V provides the empirical analysis 
and interpretation of results; finally, Section VI presents some discussion of the results 
and summarizes this study’s main conclusions. 
I.1 - Lease definition 
In a lease contract, one party (lessee) acquires the right to use an asset in 
exchange for a sequence of regular payments to that asset’s owner (lessor). The amount 
and schedule of the lease payments and the time period of the lease contract are 
discussed and agreed between the two parties and this procedure is valid for all leases, 
independently of the classification or form they may take (Brealey, 2006.). According to 
IAS 17
1
, a lease can be considered either as an operating lease or as a capital/finance 
lease. In a capital lease, the risks and rewards associated with the ownership of the asset 
are substantially transferred from lessor to lessee. Among the most common indicators 
of a capital lease, there are: the ownership of the asset is transferred to the lessee by the 
end of the contract; the lessee has the option to buy the asset from the lessor at an 
expected price; the lease term takes the majority of the economic life of the asset; if 
there is the option to prematurely terminate the contract, the lessor’s costs associated 
with it are borne by the lessee.  
                                                          
1
 Information retrieved from http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/ias/ias17. 
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Operating leases include all other lease contracts that do not meet any of the 
requirements of a capital lease, as the risks and rewards inherent to the asset are kept by 
the lessor. The accounting treatment of each type of lease is different, both for lessors 
and for lessees. Table 1 explains these accounting differences: 
Table 1 - Accounting treatment of leases 
 Capital Lease Operating Lease 
Lessee Lease is recorded as an asset and as a 
liability in the Statement of Financial 
Position. Lease payments include 
financial interests (recognized as an 
expense in the Income Statement) 
and repayment of outstanding 
liability. Asset is depreciated. 
Lease is not recognized on the 
Statement of Financial Position. Lease 
payments are recorded as an expense in 
the Income Statement. 
Lessor Lease is recorded as a receivable 
(asset) in the Statement of Financial 
Position. Financial interests are 
recognized as income in the Income 
Statement.  
Lease is recorded in the Statement of 
Financial Position as an asset, according 
to its nature. Lease Payments are 
recognized as income on the Income 
Statement.  Asset is depreciated. 
 
This study focus its analysis on capital leases, rather than in operating leases, for 
several reasons: First, it allows for an investigation where tax incentives or tax-related 
arguments for firms to use lease financing are left out of the equation. This is because, 
contrary to capital leases, operating leases allow the lessor to depreciate the asset and, 
therefore, the lessee can exchange the associated tax shields for lower lease payments. 
This is especially true if the lessor faces a higher tax burden than the lessee. Several 
studies (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995) have confirmed this 
rationale by showing that firms facing lower marginal tax rates display greater lease 
ratios than firms facing higher marginal tax rates. Second, operating leases are 
considered off-balance-sheet financing, as, contrary to capital leases, they are not 
recognized as an asset or as a liability. As a result, focusing on capital leases allows for 
a more correct comparison between leases and debt, as the accounting treatments for 
both of them are quite similar. A third reason is the fact that tax-incentives to use lease 
financing have already deserved great attention in finance literature, as it was previously 
mentioned. 
Against this background, from hereafter, the hypotheses, questions, 
interpretations and conclusions taken are exclusively related to capital leases.  
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II - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
II.1 - Leasing and firm’s characteristics 
 
In the finance literature, it is generally agreed that companies’ levels of lease 
financing or their propensity to use it are influenced by several firm-specific 
characteristics. In addition to tax incentives, as one of these influential characteristics, 
several other non-tax reasons were consistently identified as specific motivators for the 
use of leases. In the paragraphs below, we summarize some of the main arguments 
debated. 
II.1.1 - Investment opportunity set 
Financial reasons prevail as the most important motivators to use lease 
financing. For instance, the problems of asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), 
and of underinvestment (Myers, 1977) can be controlled with the use of leases. Before 
developing these two arguments, one shall take into account that the type of debt most 
similar to a lease is secured debt, as they are both asset-backed financing instruments 
and have similar consequences on a company. Issuing secured debt can be seen as a 
mean for debt holders to control for potential incentives the borrower might have to 
incur in asset substitution. Since the claim is referent to a particular asset, its value is 
not affected by stockholders/managers decisions to invest in bad or risky projects. This, 
as a result, lowers the borrowing and contracting costs of secured debt, making it 
advantageous for both the debt holder and the borrower (Smith Jr. and Warner, 1979). 
Another benefit of using secured debt is that it allows the borrower to decrease his 
exposure to potential underinvestment problems. When financing a new project with 
secured debt, a firm is more likely to invest in potentially good ventures with positive 
net present values because it can separate the claim of the debt holder from the project’s 
returns, whereas, if unsecured debt was used, the returns on the investment could be 
claimed by the already existing debt holders, if necessary. This is particularly true if the 
firm’s existing debt shows some level of riskiness (Stulz and Johnson, 1985).  
To conclude, it was argued that lease financing would have the same role as 
secured debt as a possible financing instrument that could mitigate the underinvestment 
and asset substitution problems (Smith and Wakeman, 1985). Actually, it has been 




II.1.2 - Financial condition 
Another commonly mentioned argument in favor of lease financing in the 
existing literature is that it allows the lessor to minimize the costs he would face in a 
potential situation of bankruptcy of the lessee. Indeed, among the most common types 
of corporate liabilities, leases have one of the highest priorities of claim. Therefore, in 
case of default on a lease payment or in a situation where the lessee files for bankruptcy, 
the financial interests of the lessor are considerably protected. If the lessee defaults on a 
lease payment, the lessor has the right to repossess the leased asset. This repossession 
can be restrained if, in case of bankruptcy, the asset is proved to be essential to the 
lessee’s operations. However, in this situation, the lessee has to fulfil the lease contract 
and keep on paying the lease fees to the lessor throughout the bankruptcy process, as 
these payments are then considered administrative expenses.  On the other hand, the 
financial claims of debtholders are more diluted and are not met until the bankruptcy 
process is terminated (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995). Actually, 
in a bankruptcy situation, leasing even appears to be a safer choice for financiers than is 
secured lending, due to the easier repossession of the asset by the lessor than the recover 
on the collateral by the secured lender (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009; Krishnan and 
Moyer, 1994). As a result, firms facing a situation of financial distress or potentially 
bankruptcy may see leases as a more accessible financing source. 
II.1.3 - Asset Specificity 
The characteristics of the firms’ assets and their degree of specificity, which 
might vary from industry to industry, also affect the decision to use lease financing. In 
case of a very specialized asset, which is only used by a very restricted type of firms or 
by a very specific industry, the lessor’s concerns are much higher than if the asset in 
question was commonly used across different industries or different sorts of companies. 
First, the alternative use value of a specialized asset is much lower than the one of a 
non-specialized asset; for instance, structures (e.g. office facilities) may be used for 
several purposes and across different types of firms, whereas equipment (e.g. production 
machinery) may not (Smith and Wakeman, 1985). Second, firm-specific assets 
generally depreciate faster than non-specific assets which in turn decreases the benefits 
of repossession by the lessor (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2009). Finally, widely used assets 
can more easily be transferred from one entity to another without major requirements or 
modifications (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; Williamson, 1988). These facts may result in 
higher risks for the lessor, as he would be more exposed to the lessee’s actions. This, in 
6 
 
turn, generates possible high moral hazard costs and therefore increases the costs of a 
lease contract (negotiation, enforcement, etc…). As a result, these contracting problems 
arising from leasing a firm-specific asset emphasize the advantages of, alternatively, 
purchasing the asset (Benjamin Klein et al., 1978).  
II.1.4 - Size 
The use of lease financing has also been shown to vary according to firms’ size. 
More explicitly, it has been argued that smaller firms have constantly presented higher 
values of lease financing relative to bigger companies. Several reasons have been 
pointed out for this negative correlation. First, the asymmetry of information argument, 
explaining that a firm’s size is positively related with the availability and quality of 
outside information about that firm’s present and future operations and, as consequence, 
negatively associated with risk (Schallheim et al., 1987). Therefore, leasing could 
represent a more accessible financing alternative in terms of contracting costs, for 
smaller/less transparent firms, due to a more safeguarded financial position of the 
lessor.  Second, larger firms are more likely to find alternative uses for a particular asset 
than smaller firms, when it is no longer needed for its original motive and may also be 
more effective on reselling the asset. This translates into a higher incentive for smaller 
companies to use lease financing, relative to bigger companies (Sharpe and Nguyen, 
1995). Another reason for this difference is that larger firms have a comparative 
advantage in relation to smaller firms, on issuing publicly traded securities, due to the 
inherent high fixed costs and potential scale economies. Therefore, they would prefer 
types of financing instruments that are publicly issued, which is not the case of leases 
(Barclay and Smith, 1995). In addition, it can also be argued that larger companies are 
usually more diversified and, as a consequence, achieve more constant and stable cash-
flows. This, once more, allows for the use of debt financing with lower costs, when 
compared to smaller firms (Graham et al., 1998).  
II.1.5 - Availability of collateral 
The availability of fixed assets (collateral) has been proved to be a determinant 
of firms’ capital structure (Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013) and might be related to 
their levels of lease financing. Intuitively, companies that use more fixed assets in their 
operations are expected to show higher leasing intensity, since this financing instrument 
is mainly characterized by being linked to a specific fixed asset (Graham et al., 1998). 
However, other authors have considered lease financing and relationship lending as the 
best and less risky financing alternatives for more opaque firms with fewer or even no 
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collaterals to offer, due to a less risky position of the financiers (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2006). 
II.1.6 - Other reasons 
Several other reasons are also mentioned to influence a firm’s decision to lease 
an asset and shall be important to refer. It is argued that assets whose values are more 
sensitive to maintenance decisions, this is, assets that can rapidly wear out or deteriorate 
if not carefully preserved, are more likely to be purchased, because of the separation 
between ownership and control and the agency costs inherent to a lease contract (Smith 
and Wakeman, 1985) . Leasing is more likely to happen when the company intends to 
use the asset for a shorter period than the asset’s useful life, as otherwise the ownership 
transfer costs would be higher (Smith and Wakeman, 1985). Leases, and mainly short-
term leases, reduce the need of the lessee to spend more time and resources on gathering 
information about the asset’s condition and quality, when compared to an asset purchase 
situation (Flath, 1980). Finally, the ownership structure of a firm has been argued, as 
well, to be one of the influential factors on a company’s decision to use lease financing, 
especially in the case of operating leases. Leases allow CEOs and managers with a large 
stake of the firm’s ownership to reduce their exposure to asset-specific risks, such as the 
risk of obsolescence (Mehran et al., 1999). 
II.2 - Leasing vs. debt 
 
The relationship between leases and debt is not linear, apparently, as several 
studies have reached different conclusions regarding the 
substitutability/complementarity link between these two financing options. Their 
research goal, as one might see in Bowman (1980), is to understand if leases are 
perceived to be a form of debt financing, or not. 
II.2.1 - Substitutability 
The original assumption is that, since both leases and debt commit the firm to 
the payment of fixed obligations, they reduce a firm’s overall borrowing capacity. As a 
result, they should be seen as substitutes, as higher levels of debt are associated with 
lower levels of leases and vice-versa (trade-off interaction). This substitutability result 
can be reached if, instead of comparing levels of leases and debt, one compares changes 
in their amounts. In fact, even though firms with greater debt may use more leases than 
lower-debt firms, this has a consequence of lowering their capacity to contract new 
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debt. Putting it in another way, firms reduce their potential debt levels with increases in 
their leasing levels  (Marston and Harris, 1988). Furthermore, surveys showed that, in 
the managers’ perspectives, leases are seen as substitutes for and the most important 
reason for this view is the fact that companies’ borrowing capacity was determined by 
its ability to commit to fixed payments, a characteristic of both leases and debt 
financing (Mukherjee, 1991).  This is, once again, the original assumption of the 
substitutability principle.  
When taxes are left out of the decision process of which financing instrument to 
use, debt and leases are shown to be alternatives for each other (Deloof and 
Verschueren, 1999). In addition, the substitutability result could be achieved and 
reinforced when operating leases are considered, in addition to finance leases, on the 
comparison between leases and debt (Beattie et al., 2000).  Another argument for the 
negative relationship between lease and debt financing is the fact that greater amounts 
of leases imply a higher cost of contracting debt and vice-versa and that the degree of 
this substitutability is determined by specific characteristics of the firms (Yan, 2006).   
II.2.2 - Complementarity 
On the other side of the discussion, several studies have reached the opposite 
conclusion, as results indicate that debt and leases are complements, rather than 
substitutes. In other words, higher levels of debt are associated with higher levels of 
lease financing and vice-versa. Some reasons have been pointed out for this 
complementarity between these two financing options: the market for debt and leases 
could be inefficient; differences between the tax rates of leasing and non-leasing firms
2
; 
differences in the quality of the debt issued by leasing and non-leasing companies and 
the possible non-existence of an optimal capital structure, for instance, the non-
existence of a debt limit for a particular company (Ang and Peterson, 1984). Another 
argument for this complementarity is the fact that companies may present specific 
characteristics, for instance, regarding their investment opportunity set, that allow them 
to contract greater amounts of both debt and leases (Smith and Wakeman, 1985).  
Further studies reached the same positive relationship result, supporting the argument of 
the quality difference between the debt issued by firms that lease and firms that do not 
lease. For instance, companies employing a higher variety of debt securities in their 
capital structure may be more motivated to adopt other sources of financing such as 
leases (Finucane, 1988).  
                                                          
2
 ‘Leasing firm’ refers to the Lessee (not the Lessor). 
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Others defend the complementarity theory by supporting the argument of 
different tax brackets between leasing and non-leasing firms. Firms that contract lease 
financing (operating leases in this case) can increase the levels of debt in their capital 
structure because leasing allows them to sell tax shields to the lessor, in exchange for 
lower lease payments and consequent preservation of borrowing capacity (Lewis and 
Schallheim, 1992). Further studies have also reached the conclusion that leasing firms 
consistently present higher debt levels than non-leasing firms, supporting the 
complementarity proposition (Krishnan and Moyer, 1994). 
III - HYPOTHESES & QUESTIONS 
 
III.1 – Hypotheses 
 
Several firm-specific characteristics have been shown, theoretically and 
empirically, to influence a firm’s propensity to use leases rather than debt or other 
sources of external financing. Having presented some of these characteristics and the 
arguments behind them, one may, by now, formulate several hypotheses that will serve 
as the basis for this investigation. Most of them are centered on two main facts: lease 
claims have one of the highest priorities among corporate liabilities and lessors’ 
positions are considerably safeguarded, in a lease contract. Therefore, leasing may be a 
more favorable and accessible financing option in environments of risk and insecurity. 
III.1.1- Leasing & Firms’ size 
Smaller firms are expected to use more lease financing, in relative terms, than 
larger firms. Larger firms have access to more diverse and flexible sources of financing; 
have a comparative advantage in issuing public securities, due to economies of scale; 
are more transparent to all stakeholders, due to a higher availability of information; are 
usually more diversified and stable; can more easily find alternatives of use for the 
leased asset. The link between a firms’ size and lease ratios has been regularly analyzed 
in several studies, as one might see in Barclay and Smith (1995) and in Mehran et al. 
(1999), for instance. 
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III.1.2- Leasing & Firms’ investment opportunity set 
Companies with more investment opportunities are expected to use more lease 
financing, in relative terms, than more mature firms. The instability and unpredictability 
of a growing firm affect its ability to efficiently use other sources of financing. Growing 
firms are more likely to incur in practices of asset substitution and are more exposed to 
the underinvestment problem. The link between a firm’s investment  set and its lease 
levels has been frequently studied, as one might see in Barclay and Smith (1995) and in 
Krishnan and Moyer (1994), for example. 
 
III.1.3- Leasing & Firms’ financial condition 
Firms financially constricted, or potentially bankrupted, are expected to use 
more lease financing, in relative terms, than more profitable firms. Profitable firms have 
a higher availability of internal funds and have access to more diverse and flexible 
sources of external financing. The link between a firm’s financial condition and its lease 
ratios can be observed in some studies, such as in  Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) and in 
Graham et al. (1998), for instance. 
III.1.4- Leasing & Firms’ asset specificity 
Companies utilizing more firm-specific assets are expected to use less lease 
financing, in relative terms, than others. Leasing more common or generalized assets is 
easier for the lessor, as there are more alternatives of use for them, they are usually 
easier to transport and modify and have, generally, a higher benefit of repossession. 
Hence, potential moral hazard problems between lessor and lessee are smaller and less 
likely to occur. The link between a firm’s assets’ specificity and its lease ratios has 
deserved some attention, as one might see in  Krishnan and Moyer (1994) and in 
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), for example. 
III.1.5- Leasing & Firms’ availability of collateral 
Firms with higher availability of collateral are expected to use less lease 
financing, in relative terms, than others. Companies with more fixed assets can offer 
more collateral to financiers and are more valuable in case of liquidation, which allows 
them an easier access to a wider variety of debt financing instruments. On the other 
hand, companies employing more fixed assets on its operations, more capital intensive, 
shall, understandably, use more leases, as it is a financing instrument tied to a specific 
fixed asset. As a result, one may also expect a positive relationship between firms’ 
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leasing propensity and the availability of collateral. The link between a firm’s 
availability of collateral and its lease ratios has been analyzed in several studies, as one 
might see in Graham et al. (1998) and in Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006), for instance. 
III.2 - Questions 
 
Furthermore, this study also intends to find what the relationship between lease 
and debt financing is. As stated before, this interaction is not linear, as several studies 
reach different conclusions regarding this matter and valid arguments are pointed out 
from both sides, as one might observe in Lewis and Schallheim (1992) and in Yan 
(2006). Therefore, the analysis presented in the next pages will, possibly, shed some 
light on this question: 
III.2.1 - Leasing vs. debt 
What is the relationship between lease and debt financing? Are they considered 
to be substitutes or complements? How does a firm’s overall debt level affect its leasing 
intensity? 
IV - DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
IV.1 - Sample & Information 
 
The sample collected consists on companies listed on the Bloomberg European 
500 index. Financial annual data was gathered for each company for a time period of 14 
years (2000-2013) and observations with unavailable data were excluded. Within this 
sample, several European countries are represented, as well as different industries, 
according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Companies operating 
in the “Financials” and “Utilities” sectors were excluded, in order to avoid regulation 
implications and achieve a more homogenous collection of firms. This resulted in a total 
of 341 companies and 4489 firm-year observations, but not all of them completed with 
all the necessary information. A more thorough description of the firms represented in 
the sample is presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
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Figure 2 - Sectors (GICS) represented 
 
 
This heterogeneity of the sample will contribute for a more generalized and 
appropriate set of results and subsequent conclusions, regarding the topic being 
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investigated. The following indicators were retrieved for each company and for each 
year. 
Leasing propensity 
To measure the propensity of a firm to use capital leases, the ratio of capital 
leases to property, plant & equipment was calculated, or, in other words, the portion of 
fixed assets financed through capital leases. It is therefore assumed that firms with 
higher ratios for this measure are more prone to use lease financing. This measure has 
been used before in other studies, such as Sharpe and Nguyen (1995). An alternative 
indicator would be the ratio of capital leases to assets, which shall be later used in a 
robustness test. However, one may argue that the first variable measures firms’ leasing 
propensity better, due to the direct link between leases and fixed assets. 
Debt 
To measure the debt levels of a firm two indicators were gathered: Total debt to 
assets ratio and the long-term debt (net of capital leases) to assets ratio. The first one 
will be utilized as a measure of the leverage level of a firm and the second will be 
employed in a comparison with the leasing propensity measure, as capital leases are 
considered long-term liabilities.  
Size 
To gauge a firms’ size, the natural log of assets is utilized. This indicator has 
been commonly used in the literature referred, as it shall best reflect a firm’s production 
and operations magnitude. Other indicators, such as Sales and Market Value are also 
commonly adopted. However, one may argue that the value of sales is highly influenced 
by the firm’s performance and seasonality and its market value can be highly volatile. 
Growth Opportunities 
To estimate a firm’s growth potential, the market-to-book value of equity is 
utilized. This metric is the most chosen in the finance literature, as the market value of a 
company shall take into account future strategic moves or decisions regarding its set of 
investments opportunities. 
Profitability 
To measure a firm’s profitability, it is considered the ratio of Earnings before 
Interest and Taxes (EBIT) to Assets .This metric reflects the operating efficiency of a 




The Altman Z-score is used to evaluate a firm’s financial distress level or its 
closeness to a bankruptcy situation. Other metrics are also taken into account, like the 
ratio of EBIT to interest expenses, as a measure of the firm’s ability to meet its debt 
obligations and the ratio of free cash-flow to assets, as an indicator of a firm’s capacity 
to generate cash. 
Availability of Collateral 
A firm’s level of collateral is measured by the relative amount of fixed assets 
displayed on its Statement of Financial Position. Therefore, the ratio of property plant 
and equipment to assets is utilized to measure firms’ collateral availability. 
Asset Specificity 
To gauge the specificity level of a firm’s assets it is assumed the ratio of 
research and development expenditures (R&D) to sales. The reasoning behind this 
option is the fact that the objective of R&D activities is to develop assets (e.g. 
technologies, equipment, products…) that are not available in the market and are, hence, 
unique to the firm. This indicator has been used before in other studies, as one may 
observe in Krishnan and Moyer (1994) and in Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009), to measure 
asset specify. 
Control Variables 
Other variables will be used in order to control for differences firms may display 
between each other, in addition to the explanatory variables already identified. First, this 
analysis controls for industry differences in the leverage ratios and for this purpose, 
dummy variables for each sector a firm is operating in (mentioned before) are utilized. 
Second, time differences, relating to, for instance, the macroeconomic situation and 
financial conditions, are also taken into account. This control is especially important, 
since the time period of the data collected includes the global financial crisis of 2007-
2008. Therefore, dummy variables representing each year of the analysis time window 
are adopted. Third, this investigation also controls for firms’ country of domicile, 
through the utilization of dummy variables for each nation represented. The leverage 
ratios of a company might be influenced by its home market competitive environment, 
regarding the offer and availability of credit, as well as by potential cultural differences.  
Table 2 summarizes the variables utilized in the analysis and their respective 
designation from hereafter. 
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Table 2 - Description of the variables 
Measure Variable Designation 
Leasing Propensity Capital Leases to Property Plant and 
Equipment ratio 
CL/PPE 
Debt Ratios of Debt to Assets and of (Long-
Term debt – Capital Leases) to Assets 
D/A and 
LTd/A 
Size Logarithm of Assets Log(A) 
Growth Opportunities Market-to-Book ratio of Equity M-to-B 
Profitability EBIT to Assets ratio EBIT/A 
Financial Distress Altman Z-Score
4
, ratios of EBIT to interest 




Availability of Collateral Property, Plant & Equipment to Assets 
ratio 
PPE/A 
Asset Specificity R&D expenditures to sales ratio R&D/s 
Industry differences Dummy Industry 
Temporal differences Dummy Year 
Country differences Dummy Country 
 
IV.2 - Methodological approach 
 
The empirical approach, consisting on testing the hypothesis already stated and 
analyzing the relationship between lease financing and debt will include three different 
moments.  
First, an analysis is made by splitting the sample into two reasonably equal 
groups for each explanatory variable, one for the variable’s low values (below median) 
and other for the variable’s high values (above median). Afterwards, the average values 
of CL/PPE (lease propensity) are calculated for each group, for the different variables. 
This analysis shall allow for an initial understanding of the interaction between a firm’s 
leasing propensity and its characteristics, including its long-term debt levels.  
In a second approach, different regressions, one with capital leases as the 
dependent variable (CL/PPE) and other with long-term debt as the dependent variable 
(LTd/A) will be compared. The set of explanatory variables will be the same in the two 
equations, being based on the existing literature. This analysis allows for a direct 
estimation of the effects and interactions between the explanatory variables and the 
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levels of leases and long-term debt and may shed some light of the relationship between 
these two financing options. A similar methodological approach can be seen in Graham 
et al. (1998).   
A third methodology involves the estimation of the overall debt capacity of a 
firm (D/A), based on its characteristics and, afterwards, the estimated value will be 
included as an explanatory variable in a regression with leasing propensity as the 
dependent variable (CL/PPE). This third approach shall, therefore, allow for a 
corroboration or solidification of the results and findings achieved in the first two 
approaches, regarding firms’ propensity to lease, as well as for a direct estimation of the 
impact of a firm’s overall debt levels on its lease ratios. The rationale behind this 
method is that companies chose their leasing levels, only after determining their overall 
capacity to accommodate fixed claims. In other words, the choice between using lease 
and debt financing is not considered to be simultaneous, as it is assumed in some 
methodologies such as the ones adopted in Ang and Peterson (1984) and in Finucane 
(1988), because a company’s lease intensity shall depend on its overall leverage. One 
could see a similar procedure in Mehran et al. (1999).  
The main goal of adopting these three different but complementary 
methodologies is to observe if the results and conclusions obtained in each section are 
coherent and consistent.  
Table 3 summarizes the three methodologies adopted in this study: 
 
Table 3 - Methodological summary 
 Methodology Objective 
Part I Sample split into two groups for each 
explanatory variable and calculate the 
average CL/PPE value for each group. 
Analyzing the relationship between 
a firm’s leasing propensity and its 
specific characteristics,  
Part II CL/PPE = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + … 
 
LTd/A = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + … 
Estimate a direct interaction between 
leases and explanatory variables. 
Evaluate relationship between leases 
and long-term debt 
Part III D/A = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + … 
 
CL/PPE = α + β(D/A) + β1X1 + β2X2 + … 
Estimate a direct interaction between 






V - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
 
This section is dedicated to the analysis and statistical treatment of the sample 
and data gathered. The objective is to formulate a possible answer to the question 
proposed and to test the formulated hypothesis, based on the results attained and 
associated interpretations.    
V.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 presents a summary of some statistical indicators for the variables. 
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. 
CL/PPE 0.043 0.088 0.000 0.012 0.921 
CL/A 0.010 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.509 
LTd/A 0.199 0.131 0.000 0.186 0.830 
D/A 0.258 0.160 0.000 0.246 1.808 
Log(A) 3.878 0.715 0.214 3.862 5.947 
M-to-B 3.544 10.422 -131.463 2.370 200.569 
PPE/A 0.260 0.191 0.001 0.219 0.964 
EBIT/A 0.095 0.089 -1.072 0.084 1.216 
R&D/s 4.049 6.559 0.000 1.555 68.010 
FCF/A 0.054 0.088 -1.213 0.049 1.276 
EBIT/IE 27.647 181.710 -557.500 5.965 4350.800 
Z-score 3.938 4.063 -7.724 3.263 88.639 
 
It can be observed that the existing sample is well diversified in terms of the 
indicators collected. There are small and large firms (the average value of total assets is 
around 7.5US$million), growing and mature firms (some might be in a bankruptcy 
situation) and firms in very different financial states (high and low-leveraged firms, 
high and low-profit firms, etc…). This shall allow for a good representativeness of the 
results obtained. The average level of capital leases is 1% of assets and the average 
value of long-term debt (net of capital leases) is around 20% of assets. Even though 
lease financing can be used to overcome a lot of problems and situations that may arise 
in a credit contract between lender and borrower, other types of long-term debt are more 
important financing sources. Possibly the best explanation for this fact is the higher 
flexibility that debt offers to the borrower, since the financing amount can be used for 
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multiple purposes as it is not tied to a specific asset. It is also perceived that about half 
of the observations show levels of capital leases below 1.2% of Property, Plant & 
Equipment, which indicates that this source of financing is not the main one used for 
funding the fixed assets of a firm, even though it is specifically utilized for that purpose.  
V.2 - Leasing & years 
 
An interesting factor to take into account is the number of companies, included 
in the sample, that report leases each year. Lease financing is relatively more recent and 
innovative than other debt instruments and it has been gaining relevance in the last 
several years. For instance, according to data from ‘Associação Portuguesa de Leasing, 
Factoring e Renting’, the total leasing volume in Portugal has been constantly 
increasing between the years of 2002 and 2007
5
 (followed by a decrease due to the 
financial crisis, possibly), which might indicate that leasing is becoming a more 
important and widely adopted financing instrument. Relative to the sample collected, 
Figure 3 displays the percentage of companies reporting capital leases each year.  
 
Figure 3 - Firms reporting leases, by year 
 
 
As one can see, the trend observed in Portugal applies as well to this sample of 
European firms. Between the years of 2000 and of 2010, the percentage of firms 
reporting capital leases increases about 50pp, from 20% to 70%, which is a very 
                                                          
5










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013
19 
 
significant evolution. This fact solidifies the position of leasing as an increasingly 
important financing instrument in the modern business world. 
Different macroeconomic and financial environments in each year of the sample 
collected may potentially influence the leverage levels of the firms considered in this 
study, including the amount of capital leases. Controlling for this factor shall be 
particularly important in this case, since the financial crisis of 2007-2008 had strong and 
global consequences in most companies’ financial situation, which may be reflected on 
the values of the indicators collected. Furthermore, it would be important to see the 
evolution of debt ratios and of lease ratios throughout these years. One may argue that, 
since financial breakdown of 2007-2008 turned firm’s access to credit more difficult 
(Chor and Manova, 2012; Cornett et al., 2011), it would be expected to see a significant 
decrease on the firms’ debt ratios. Figure 4 presents the firms’ weighted average ratios 
of debt to assets from the years of 2000 to 2013. 
 
Figure 4 – Average firms’ ratios of debt-to-assets, by year 
 
 
As one may observe, the leverage levels of firms vary considerably from year to 
year. The average ratio of total debt to assets decreased about 4pp, from 29% to 25%, 
between the years of 2008 and 2010. It is also interesting to notice that this indicator 
followed exactly the opposite path (increasing 4pp, from 25% to 29%) in the years 
preceding the financial crisis, from 2005 to 2007. But what happened to the average 
ratios of capital leases and long-term debt? Comparing the way of how these two ratios 
evolved throughout this period of time could already give some indications about a 
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should have decreased from 2008 onwards, a higher change should be expected for the 
ratio of long-term debt than for the ratio of capital leases, as lease financing is 
significantly less risky than its long-term debt alternatives and would be more favorable 
in periods of credit constraints. Bellow, one can see the evolution of capital leases 
(Figure 5) and long-term debt (Figure 6) from 2000 to 2013. 
Figure 5 – Average firms’ ratios of capital leases to assets, by year 
 
Figure 6 – Average firms’ ratios of long-term debt (excluding capital leases) to 
assets, by year 
 
As expected, both ratios decrease after 2007: the long-term debt ratio goes down 
about 3pp, from 23% to 20%, whereas the ratio of capital leases declines slightly less 
than 1pp, supporting the previous assumption. An interesting fact is that long-term debt 
levels increased significantly in the pre-crisis period, from 17% to 23%. In Graph 5 it is 
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them since 2000, which may more accurately represent the evolution of this indicator 
throughout the years. Despite different values, the trend observed is quite similar. 
V.3 - Leasing & industries 
 
It has been shown that there are persistent industry differences on the lease ratios 
of firms (Finucane, 1988). Due to the different levels of specificity and use 
requirements of the assets utilized in each business’s operational procedures, financing 
these same assets through leases might be more advantageous in some industries than 
others. For instance, activities involving the manufacturing of a particular good might 
find it less useful to lease assets than others, since these assets are linked to a particular 
purpose, with few or no alternatives of use and might be harder to modify or transfer 
from one entity to other.  On the other hand, for wholesale and retail industries, for 
instance, where the main assets should be simply buildings, it may be easier to find 
alternatives of use for the leased assets. Hence, it shall be necessary to take into account 
these industry dissimilarities. Figure 7 presents the average number of firms reporting 
capital leases, in the sample, for each GICS sector. 
 
Figure 7 - Firms reporting capital leases, by sector 
 
Firms operating in the sectors of ‘Information Technology’ (Software and 
Services, Technology Hardware and Equipment…), ‘Energy’ and ‘Health Care’ (Health 
Care Equipment and Services, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology) report the fewest 
capital leases. Following the argument displayed above, this would be the predictable 











hand, companies operating in the sectors of ‘Consumer Staples’ (Food and Staples 
Retailing, Food, Beverage and Tobacco…), and ‘Consumer Discretionary’ ( Retailing, 
Hotels Restaurants & Leisure…) report relatively more capital leases, as they may not 
require the use of many firm-specific assets on their operational activity. It is, thereby, 
necessary to take into account these industry differences in the analysis. 
V.4 - Leasing & countries 
 
Another factor previously mentioned that could influence the use of lease 
financing by firms was their country of domicile. Essentially, it could be argued that, 
from possibly different competitive environments in terms of the offer and availability 
of lease financing to simple cultural differences, each country might reflect various 
contexts and environments that might affect, in a certain manner, the choice of lease 
financing. For instance, this financing instrument may be used by companies from a 
particular country simply because it is a common practice among its peers or within its 
business, without really sustaining the decision based on a thorough financial analysis. 
In addition, the availability and accessibility of lease financing providers may very well 
vary from country to country. Therefore, a need to control for these potential country 
differences in this analysis may arise. Figure 8 presents the percentage of firms 
reporting capital leases for each European country represented in the sample: 
 
Figure 8 - Firms reporting capital leases, by country 
 
Looking at Figure 8, one may conclude that the average amount of firms 













country to country. It can be as small as 30% in the case of Denmark or as large as 80% 
in the case of Austria. Even though an explicit pattern cannot be identified (for instance, 
one could expect more financially developed countries, as Switzerland, United 
Kingdom or Sweden, to present higher lease ratios than their counterparts in this 
sample, as Greece, Italy or Portugal)
6
 , these differences of lease ratios may indicate 
possible national influences or biases that need to be controlled for. 
V.5 - Correlations 
Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent 
variables of leasing propensity and debt, and the explanatory variables selected. 
 
Table 5 - Correlation coefficients (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
 CL/PPE LTd/A D/A 
LTd/A -0.03* - - 
Log(A) -0.09*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 
M-to-B 0.01 -0.04*** -0.03** 
PPE/A -0.07*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 
EBIT/A -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.19*** 
FCF/A -0.02 -0.12*** -0.17*** 
EBIT/ie -0.02* -0.12*** -0.13*** 
Z-score -0.01 -0.01 -0.05*** 
R&D/s 0.00 -0.17*** 0.02 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
 
The correlation values between dependent variables and explanatory variables 
might be perceived as some initial evidence of the relationships this study intends to 
find and understand. Some important correlations should be highlighted: Leasing 
propensity is negatively and significantly correlated with the size of the firm and with 
the availability of collateral. These two results are aligned with the hypothesis 
established earlier. Regarding the level of debt (long-term and total), it is significantly 
and negatively correlated with the market-to-book ratio of the firm and positively 
correlated with the availability of collateral and with the size of the firm. Once more, 
these correlations are in accordance with the hypothesis formulated before. One can also 
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observe that both external financing options are negatively correlated with measures of 
the financial condition of the company (EBIT/A, EBIT/ie, FCFA and Z-score). Finally, 
the correlation between LTd/A and CL/PPE is negative and statistically significant
7
, 
which might be seen as an indicator of a substitutability relation between these two 
financing options. 
It is also important to check the correlation values among explanatory variables 
to see if potential multicollinearity problems can arise in the regression analysis, 
especially between the variables that measure the financial situation of a firm 
(profitability, debt obligations coverage, Free Cash-Flow and Altman Z-score). Table 8 
presents the Person-Correlation values between explanatory variables: 
 
Table 6 - Correlation coefficients (cont.) (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). 
The variables EBIT/A, EBIT/ie and FCF/A are significantly and positively 
correlated, particularly EBIT/A and FCF/A.  This, as previously assumed, would be 
expected since these three are, somehow, measures of the same issue. The variable of 
Altman Z-score does not present a considerably high correlation with these variables, 
possibly because its calculation comprises more than one indicator of a firm’s financial 
condition. 
V.6 - Methodology I 
 
As a first step to the understanding and development of the hypotheses and 
questions postulated, this method consists on splitting the observations in two groups 
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 A similar result is achieved if CL/A is used instead of CL/PPE 
 Log(A) M-to-B PPE/A EBIT/A FCF/A EBIT/ie Z-score R&D/s 
Log(A) - -0.11*** 0.08*** -0.07*** -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04** -0.04** 
M-to-B  - -0.05*** 0.3*** 0.27*** 0.03** 0.05*** 0.00 
PPE/A   - -0.02 -0.17*** 0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 
EBIT/A    - 0.80*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 0.00 
FCF/A     - 0.14*** 0.14*** -0.05*** 
EBIT/ie      - 0.07*** -0.02 
Z-score       - 0.08*** 
R&D/s        - 
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for each explanatory variable (lower values and higher values), and observing the 
average levels of lease financing (CL/PPE) in each group. For each indicator, observed 
values which are lower than its median are included in one group and observed values 
higher than its median are included in other group, resulting in two different and equally 
relevant (in terms of observations) clusters for each firm’s characteristic to be studied. 
Table 7 displays the results of this analysis.  
 
Table 7 - Methodology I – results (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
 CL/PPE 







(for group with 
higher values) 
Log(A) 5.00% 0.98pp** 4.02% 
M-to-B 3.90% 0.99pp** 4.89% 
PPE/A 5.33% 1.68pp*** 3.65% 
EBIT/A 5.25% 1.62pp*** 3.63% 
EBIT/ie 5.53% 2.19pp*** 3.34% 
FCF/A 4.80% 0.67pp* 4.13% 
Z-score 4.34% 0.4pp* 3.94% 
R&D/s 3.19% 0.13pp 3.32% 
LTd/A 4.96% 1.00pp** 3.96% 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***).  
 
By doing this simple division of the sample, one can interpret the results 
presented in the table above in the following manner: smaller firms use relatively more 
lease financing than larger firms, firms with more investment opportunities and growth 
potential present a higher leasing activity than their counterparts and firms with less 
availability of collateral use relatively more lease financing than firms with more fixed 
assets. Furthermore, firms in a worst financial situation (lower values of EBIT/A, 
EBIT/ie, FCF/A and Z-score) are more prone to lease financing than firms in a better 
financial condition. The lease ratios associated with the variable R&D/s are not 
significantly different between the two groups. Finally, companies reporting higher 
levels of long-term debt appear to report fewer leasing activity which suggests a 
substitutability relationship between these two financing instruments. This first 
methodological approach can be understood as a good prediction of the results one 
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 Absolute values of the CL/PPE differences, between groups  
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might achieve in following analysis. According to these values and differences, all of 
the previously assumed interactions in Section III between a firm’s characteristics and 
its lease ratios are corroborated and an idea of the relationship between debt and leases 
emerges. 
V.7 - Methodology II 
 
The following section presents the results achieved through pooled OLS and 
Tobit regressions with the measures related to the corporate liability structure as 
dependent variables (LTd/A and CL/PPE) and a specific set of explanatory variables, 
controlling for time, sector and country fixed effects. As previously mentioned, this 
analysis has the objective to indirectly compare long-term debt financing (excluding 
capital leases) and lease financing (capital leases), through the study of the influence of 
firm specific characteristics that have been consistently shown in the existing finance 
literature, to influence their levels. For the dependent variable of CL/PPE, a Tobit 
approach is adopted in addition to the standard OLS methodology. Since there are some 
observations where the value for capital leases is equal to zero, accounting for this 
problem of a limited dependent variable, (by left censoring values equal to zero) may be 
necessary. Table 8 displays the results: 
Table 8 - Methodology II – results (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). The 
values in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics. 




































Years Yes*** Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes** Yes*** Yes*** 
Countries Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Adjusted R² 0.125 0.065 - 
Observations 2510 2510 2510 
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 Some interpretations are possible when looking at the results displayed in Table 
8. Regarding the size of a firm, the hypothesis was that smaller firms would have a 
tendency to use relatively more lease financing than larger firms and these would use 
relatively more debt financing than smaller firms. In relation to the regressions for the 
capital lease ratios, one can observe that the coefficient for the variable measuring firm 
size (log(A)) is negative and statistically significant in one of the regressions (OLS). 
This result suggests that smaller firms do, indeed, show a higher leasing activity than 
larger firms, confirming the associated hypothesis. A similar negative relationship 
between firm size and leasing propensity is also reached in several studies such as 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009). In the long-term debt 
equation, this variable’s coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting 
that larger firms use relatively more debt financing than smaller firms. This positive 
relationship between firm size and use of long-term debt can also be seen in Graham et 
al. (1998). Firms with higher availability of fixed assets tend to present higher long-term 
debt levels. The sign of this variable’s (PPE/A) coefficient is positive and significant for 
the LTd/A regression. This result is aligned with the arguments of a positive 
relationship between companies’ level of long-term debt and availability of collateral 
found in Graham et al. (1998). Relative to the lease equations, the coefficients 
associated with the variable PPE/A are not statistically significant, so no conclusion can 
be taken.  Regarding the profitability levels of a firm (EBIT/A), the values obtained 
support the pecking order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984), as companies 
will likely use internal funds as a first financing source and, only afterwards, external 
financing is considered. As one can see, the coefficients estimated are negative and 
statistically significant for both the long-term debt and the leases regressions.  
Regarding the investment opportunity set, no valid conclusions can be taken, as the 
variable’s (M-to-B) coefficients are not statistically significant in both the debt and 
lease regressions. In this analysis it was important to include time dummy variables, in 
order to control for the influences of different macroeconomic and financial conjectures, 
previously verified, as well as country and sector dummies. The statistical significance 
evidenced by these dummy groups demonstrates the importance of controlling the 
analysis for these effects. 
Summarizing, smaller firms use relatively more lease financing than larger 
firms, which prefer debt financing; firms with relatively more fixed assets use more 
debt, in relative terms; more profitable firms are less leveraged as they take advantage 
of higher availability of internal funds to finance their operations. Regarding the 
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relationship between long-term debt and leases, this comparative analysis already sheds 
some light on this matter. Due to the different results obtained for the variables Log(A) 
(positively related with LT/d and negatively related with CL/PPE) and similar results 
for the variable EBIT/A (negatively related with both LTd/A and CL/PPE), one could 
suggest that these two financing options can either be seen as substitutes or as 
complements, respectively. 
V.8 - Methodology III 
 
This third methodological approach will allow for a better understanding of the 
relationship between debt and lease financing as well as testing the hypothesis 
proposed, while possibly solidifying the conclusions reached in previous sections.  
It could be easily agreed that a company first chooses its overall debt capacity 
and only then decides on how to fill up this borrowing capacity with different types of 
debt instruments, like ordinary debt or capital leases. Therefore, an initial OLS equation 
is estimated with the total debt ratio (D/A) as the dependent variable and with a set of 
explanatory variables that have been shown to influence firms’ leverage levels. The next 
step is to estimate the values of D/A for each observation which will be, subsequently, 
used as one of the explanatory variables on the final regression, with leasing propensity 
(CL/PPE) as the dependent variable. Two regressions are estimated for the lease 
(CL/PPE) variable: One uses the OLS approach and the other utilizes the Tobit 
procedure to control for the problem of a truncated dependent variable. The EBIT/A 
variable is used to estimate the debt ratio and it is then substituted in the lease 
regression by an overall and more complete measure of a firm’s financial state, which is 
the Altman Z-score (Z-score). Recall that a negative relationship is expected, since 
companies in a better financial situation should find it less necessary and efficient to use 
lease financing. One variable measuring asset specificity (R&D/s) is added and a 
negative coefficient is predicted, as firms find it less accessible to lease specific assets 
than more commonly used assets. This analysis controls for year, sector and country 























































Years Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Sectors Yes*** Yes** Yes** 
Countries Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Adjusted R² 0.161 0.105 - 
Observations 4283 1507 1507 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level (***). The 
values in parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics. 
 
Regarding the debt equation, the results obtained for the variables measuring 
profitability (EBIT/A), availability of collateral (PPE/A) and firm size (Log(A)) might 
be seen as supportive of the findings in previous analysis. Even though the dependent 
variables are different (LTd/A first and D/A now), the arguments displayed for the 
effects of these indicators on firms’ debt levels can be equally applied. Therefore, 
aligned with the results achieved in Methodology II, the coefficients of Log(A) and 
PPE/A are positive and significant whereas the coefficient obtained for EBIT/A is 
negative and significant. The effect of a firm’s investment opportunity set (M-to-B) on 
its total leverage ratio is not clarified. Even though the value is positive and statistically 
significant, it is not economically substantial.  
Shifting now the focus to the leasing propensity regressions, no statistically 
significant results were found for the variable Log(A). However, the effect of firm size 
on firms leasing propensity is consistent with the one obtained in Methodologies I and 
II. Firms in a better financial condition will use relatively less lease financing than will 
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firms in a worst financial situation. The coefficient associated with the level of financial 
distress (Z-score) of a firm is negative and significant in one of the regressions (Tobit). 
Even though its economic relevance is noticeably questionable, with a value close to 
zero, it may still evidence the usefulness of lease financing for companies in a situation 
of financial distress or near bankruptcy. Actually, Krishnan and Moyer (1994) find that 
leasing firms display lower values of the Altman Z-score than non-leasing firms. 
Regarding the effect of a firm’s investment opportunity set, the availability of collateral 
and the specificity of its assets on its leasing propensity, no conclusion can be drawn as 
the coefficients associated with the variables M-to-B and PPE/A and R&D/s are not 
statistically significant. Finally, looking at the relationship between lease financing and 
total debt level (D/A), the coefficient associated with this variable is negative and 
significant in one of the regressions (OLS). This fact supports the idea that leases and 
debt are seen as two alternative forms of external financing, as companies’ percentage 
of PPE financed though capital leases decreases with higher levels of total debt. In other 
words, non-lease debt displaces leases as the financing instruments for companies’ fixed 
assets.  In relation to the control variables, this last analysis of a firm’s propensity to 
lease took into account industry, country and time variations. Regarding industry 
differences and using the ‘Industrials’ sector as a benchmark, companies operating in 
the ‘Materials’ sector consistently showed to report relatively lower levels of capital 
leases, as the coefficients associated with this variable were negative and statistically 
significant across both regressions. This fact could be supportive of the asset specificity 
hypothesis, as companies in this sector are dedicated to the manufacturing of particular 
products (e.g. chemicals, metals, glass, paper…) where there is a greater need for more 
specific assets than there is for ‘Industrials’ companies (which may include providers of 
commercial, professional and transportation services). Therefore, they should find lease 
financing less suitable for funding their operations.  
Regarding intra-sample differences of firms’ country of domicile and using the 
United Kingdom as benchmark, some conclusions can be drawn as well. Companies 
from nations like Greece and Portugal appear to consistently show relatively higher 
levels of lease financing than British companies. The coefficients associated with these 
variables were positive and statistically significant in the two lease regressions. A 
possible explanation for this result is the fact that these two countries were heavily 
affected by the global financial crisis, when compared with the United Kingdom, which, 
logically, increased the uncertainty and risk levels in their respective credit markets. 
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Leases, due to the lower associated financial risk to the borrower, might have been a 
more fitted and safer solution in this environment of insecurity.  
Controlling for yearly variation proved, once more, to be adequate, as 
companies’ leasing propensity was shown to be influenced by the year in question. 
V.9 - Robustness tests 
 
In order to test the effectiveness of the results and conclusions drawn previously, 
several factors are added into consideration. The goal here is to observe if different 
scenarios can, somehow, induce considerable changes in the regression parameters, 
which will consequently lead to different interpretations regarding firms’ leasing 
propensity. 
First, a regression is made without including companies from the United 
Kingdom. In the sample gathered, about 30% of the companies represented this nation, 
which is practically the double of the second most representative country (about 15%), 
France. Seeing if the exclusion of these companies affects or changes the results 
previously displayed appears to be, therefore, an important element to take into 
consideration, due to possible country-specific biases. Second, a division of the total 
observations is made into two groups, relative to the years in question. Two regressions 
are calculated, one including the observations between the years of 2000 and 2007 and 
other with the observations from 2008 to 2013. The reasoning behind it is to see if the 
global financial crisis of 2007-2008 induces changes on the estimated parameters and 
also to observe if the conclusions drawn within a pre-crisis sample hold for post-crisis 
observations, or vice-versa. Lastly, a regression is calculated where a different 
dependent variable (instead of CL/PPE) is used to measure firms’ leasing propensity, 
which is the ratio of capital leases to assets (CL/A).  
Table 10 presents the regression results for a sample, where companies from the 
United Kingdom are excluded. Two regressions are calculated, with leasing propensity 
(CL/PPE) as the dependent variable, one adopting the OLS method and the other with 







Table 10 - Robustness test I – results (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
Variables                                     CL/PPE 





























Years Yes Yes 
Sectors Yes Yes 
Countries Yes (no U.K.) *** Yes (no U.K.) *** 
Adjusted R² 0.07 - 
Observations 1094 1094 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level(***). The values in 
parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics. 
 
Examining the results presented in Table 10, one may realize that there are no 
contradictions regarding the conclusions taken from previous analysis. Additionally, a 
new insight, regarding the hypothesis of leasing propensity and asset specificity, 
emerges. The coefficients associated with the variable measuring asset specificity 
(R&D/s) are negative and statistically significant in both regressions but are not as 
economically substantial as one would require to clearly sustain the corresponding 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, it may still be argued that this result is aligned with the idea 
that firms making relatively more use of specific assets tend to present lower leasing 
propensity. 
In Table 11, one may see the results achieved when separating the observations 
into pre-crisis and post-crisis clusters. CL/PPE is the dependent variable, measuring 
leasing propensity, and two regressions are calculating for each situation, one adopting 
the OLS method and the other with the Tobit approach to control for the truncated 




Table 11 - Robustness test II – results (refer to Table 4 for the description of the variables) 
Variables CL/PPE - Pre-Crisis 
(OLS)                (Tobit) 
CL/PPE - Post-Crisis 

























































Years  (2000-2007) *** (2000-2007) *** (2008-2013) * (2008-2013) ** 
Sectors Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Countries Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** Yes*** 
Adjusted R² 0.179 - 0.139 - 
Observations 505 505 1002 1002 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level(***). The values in parenthesis are the 
calculated t-statistics. 
 
Once more, the conclusions regarding firms’ propensity to lease and their 
characteristics, established in previous sections still hold. In addition, an interesting 
result comes up: in the pre-crisis group, companies with a higher market-to-book ratio 
report relatively less capital leases than their counterparts as the coefficients associated 
with this variable are negative and statistically significant for both regressions. Despite 
low economic substance, the result is the opposite of the one expected in the associated 
hypothesis and achieved in ‘Methodology I’, where companies with more investment 
opportunities would use relatively more lease financing. Nevertheless, it is similar to the 
outcome achieved by Graham et al. (1998), where the argument for the negative 
relationship is in accordance with the corporate borrowing theory suggested by Myers 
(1977), as the leverage level of a firm should be inversely related to its market value 
accounted for growth opportunities, or, in other words, assets-in-place should be 
financed with greater amounts of debt than growth opportunities.  
In this robustness test, the results and given explanations for higher relative 
levels of lease financing presented by companies from Portugal and Greece, when 
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compared to firms from the United Kingdom are corroborated. The coefficients 
associated with these two countries’ dummy variables are positive and statistically 
significant for both of the regressions in the post-crisis period, whereas the results in the 
pre-crisis sample are not as clear. One should take into account that the majority of this 
study’s observations (about 2/3) are included in the second group, relating to the years 
of 2008 and onwards.  
Finally, in Table 12 are presented the results achieved when changing the 
dependent variable to CL/A. This indicator shall be less accurate for measuring firms’ 
leasing propensity, as their assets’ value includes several other rubrics (in addition to 
Property, Plant & Equipment), that have no connection or are completely independent 
of their levels of capital leases. However, as it has also been commonly used in past 
similar studies, taking it into account shall be pertinent. 
 
Table 12 - Robustness test III – results (refer to table-4 for the description of the variables) 
Variables                                         CL/A 





























Years Yes*** Yes*** 
Sectors Yes*** Yes*** 
Countries Yes** Yes*** 
Adjusted R² 0.29 - 
Observations 1507 1094 
Statistical significance at the 10% level (*), 5% level (**), and 1% level(***). The values in 
parenthesis are the calculated t-statistics. 
 
When observing Table 12, one may conclude that there is a particular change in 
the results previously obtained, namely on the relationship between a firm’s propensity 
to lease and the availability of collateral. The coefficients associated with the variable 
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PPE/A are positive and statistically significant, suggesting an opposite effect of the one 
found in ‘Methodology I’. Companies with relatively more fixed assets appear to have a 
greater leasing propensity than others. As it was mentioned in the hypotheses section, 
Graham et al. (1998) argue that firms should use relatively more leases as they have 
more fixed assets, due to a direct connection existing between that financing form and 
those type of assets. It seems, therefore, that both this vision and the opposite negative 
relationship (previously achieved) argued by Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2006) are 
reached when different measures of leasing propensity are utilized.  
To conclude, the results and interpretations did not suffer significant alterations 
in the robustness tests, as one can see, which solidifies this study’s conclusions. 
VI - DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research provides consistent empirical evidence that the decision to use 
lease financing, specifically capital leases, is influenced by specific firm characteristics, 
namely, the size of the firm, its investment opportunity set, the relative amount of 
collateral it offers, its financial state, the specificity of its assets and its overall debt 
levels. In addition, the fact that some of these features relate differently with long-term 
debt ratios than they do with lease ratios reveals that these two financing instruments 
are reasonably different and can, therefore, be seen as substitutes.  
The results displayed suggest that firms’ propensity to use capital leases 
decreases with their size. Larger firms can take advantage of economies of scale when 
issuing publicly traded securities, due to fixed costs, when compared to smaller firms; 
there is usually a higher availability of information regarding larger firms’ operations 
and strategic moves than there is for smaller companies; larger firms are usually more 
diversified and financially stable than smaller ones; and, finally, larger firms can better 
find alternative uses for its assets than do smaller firms. These facts allow larger firms 
to use debt financing with better terms and conditions and to prefer a more flexible debt 
financing to lease financing.  
Firms in a better financial state (high profitability, low level financial distress) 
appear to be less prone to lease financing than financially constricted firms. First, 
according to the pecking order theory, firms prefer to finance their investments with 
internal funds and, when this option is not available, they consider external financing. 
Second, companies in a worse financial condition might see lease financing as one of 
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the few external financing instruments available and possibly the most accessible due to 
a lower inherent risk borne by the creditor, resultant of lease’s high priority of claim. On 
the other hand, financially healthier companies have a more accessible and efficient 
access to a more diverse and flexible sources of external financing.  
Leasing propensity appears to be smaller for firms that employ relatively more 
specific assets. Lease contracts are more difficult to elaborate and negotiate for specific 
assets, resulting in higher contracting costs, due to a potentially riskier position of the 
lessor and consequent greater problems and divergences between him and the lessee. 
Specific assets have lower alternatives of use, usually have lower repossession benefits, 
due to higher depreciation and are generally more difficult to transport and/or modify.  
Results regarding firms’ leasing activity and their availability of collateral are 
mixed, as they varied with the leasing propensity measure utilized. When using CL/PPE 
as the indicator, the relationship obtained was negative (Methodology I). Firms with 
relatively more fixed assets, due to their higher liquidation value and greater collateral 
offering on their borrowings, can more easily and efficiently gain access to various debt 
financing instruments than more opaque firms, which find lease financing a less risky 
and more available alternative for their lack of collateral and lower liquidity. On the 
other hand, the relationship achieved was the opposite when CL/A was used as the 
leasing propensity measure (Robustness test III). Companies employing relatively more 
property, plant and equipment in their operations should use lease financing the most, 
due to the direct connection between this financing option and fixed assets. 
Nevertheless, as it is argued that the first indicator measures firms’ leasing propensity 
the better, the negative association shall be the most accurate and acceptable.  
The results achieved when testing the relationship between firms’ investment 
opportunity set and their leasing propensity were the least clarified. The values observed 
in ‘Methodology I’ supported the hypothesis formulated, as firms with relatively more 
investment opportunities present higher lease ratios. The reasoning behind it is that 
leases allow these firms to reduce their exposure to underinvestment problems, due to 
the segregation of the lessor’s claim from the investments’ potential cash-flows. 
Furthermore, leases guarantee a more safeguarded position of the borrower (lessor), as 
he is less exposed to potential asset substitution practices of the lessee, since their claim 
is tied to a specific asset and is not affected by the borrower’s decision to invest in 
riskier projects. In the robustness tests (Robustness test II – pre-crisis regression), 
however, results suggest a negative relationship between firms’ investment opportunity 
set and their leasing propensity. The argument behind this is the fact that the total debt 
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levels of a firm should be inversely related to its market value accounted for growth 
opportunities. Nonetheless, the results achieved in ‘Methodology I’ shall be the most 
acceptable, as they took into account the whole sample and all of the observations.  
This research indicates that leases and debt are seen as substitutes. Capital leases 
and long-term debt appear to present a trade-off relationship, as results indicate that they 
are alternative external financing instruments. Furthermore, results also show that the 
level of a firm’s overall debt is negatively associated with leasing activity, suggesting, 
once again, this trade-off interaction. As it was mentioned, the main argument behind 
this substitutability relationship is the fact that these two financing options influence 
companies’ ability to cover fixed payments and, hence, reduce the company’s overall 
borrowing capacity. This conclusion, one may argue, was expected for capital leases 
and debt, because one of the main arguments behind the complementarity relationship is 
tax-related, more plausible when operating leases are taken into account. 
Finally, this study suggests that a firm’s leasing propensity significantly varies 
with its country of domicile, with the sector it is operating in and with its surrounding 
macroeconomic environment. 
The results achieved, regarding firms’ characteristics and their leasing 
propensity are, overall, consistent with previous findings in the existing finance 
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